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Introduction 
 Access control is a fundamental problem in all businesses.  A company spends 
money on copiers and paper and wants to ensure that these items do not get stolen or a 
company has documents about a new product that it does not want to share with 
competing companies.  Both of these examples require a company to decide who can 
walk into the building and what that person can view, copy, or take out of the building.  
Many companies require that a badge be displayed to enter the building and employees 
lock important documents in cabinets.  Some companies just hang a bell on the door so 
that an employee from the back room can know when a person enters the building.   
 Computers and the Internet allow businesses to work outside of a single building.  
Access to digital resources can occur from anywhere at any time of day.  Controlling 
access to resources is fundamental to information security but the distributed nature of 
the Internet makes complete and centralized control impossible.  Database administrators 
are concerned with access by users to database records.  Who can update a record and 
who can read a record?  Network administrators are worried about who can send data out 
through the firewall or access an account inside the network from a home machine.  
Some organizations are in the business of providing information and have data available 
to everyone without requiring a user ID, password, or any other login method.  Many 
organizations prefer to control access to the digital information and require that a user ID 
and password be provided to gain access.    
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 All businesses have to find the balance between protecting assets and allowing 
employees to do their jobs.  Many companies require an employee badge be shown in a 
building and many even require that badge be used to gain access to certain rooms inside 
the building such as a printer room.  Few companies find it cost effective to require 
multiple forms of photo identification be presented to enter each and every room in the 
building.  The possibility of malicious strangers entering the building is considered 
unlikely and the cost of the extra security guards may be more than the information they 
are protecting is worth.  In the digital world of access control, most system administrators 
require users to have passwords at least eight characters long.  Few find it efficient to 
require passwords of at least fifty characters.  The administrator and the user would each 
spend too much time resetting forgotten passwords or the users would compromise the 
security by writing those long passwords down where others could find them.   
 Administrators, managers, and users are all interested in a solution that protects 
the resources yet is transparent, or as transparent as possible, to the users.  When 
developing an access control policy, ease of use is considered along with balancing the 
likelihood of attack or error against the cost of failure.  The first section of this paper will 
briefly describe some of the layers of security available in a distributed world.  Some 
solutions appear seamless to the users, others do not.  The second section will take a 
deeper look at access control methods for protecting resources at the operating system 
level and how these methods can add additional transparent protection of resources.  
Finally, the third section will look at the resources which will help a business decide if an 
they need a mandatory access control policy for their operating systems and how they 
might choose such a policy.  The information provided in this paper should cut through 
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the confusion associated with the many security solutions and assist in the development 
of an access control policy.   
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1. Layers of Protection. 
 
 Growth in the field of information security is a response to several types of 
attacks.  The goal is to prevent the attacks but also to recognize when an attack has 
occurred and to be prepared to respond to the worst possible cases.  Response may 
include repairing the damage, adding or changing security prevention measures, and 
reporting an incident to law enforcement.  The most common attacks are denial of service 
attacks,  Man-in-the-Middle attacks, Viruses, and Exploiting Programmer Errors 
(Petrocelli, 2005, p.130 ).Denial of Service (DOS) attacks are attempts to make a service 
unavailable by crashing the application, system, or network such as one that targeted a 
Sun Microsystems demo in March of 2006 (Sun, 2006).  The site was overwhelmed with 
bogus inquiries and became unresponsive to legitimate users.  Sun responded by 
removing the public access to the demonstration and making it available only to 
registered users.  Some DOS attacks such as this one turn out to be only an annoyance but 
DOS attacks have the potential for much more widespread damage.  The 2005 CSI/FBI 
Computer Crime and Security Survey lists DOS attacks as the fourth highest contributer 
to financial losses.  Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks allow a malicious user to capture 
information that is in transit between machines (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and 
Richardson, 2005, p15).One type of MITM attack allows authentication information to be 
forwarded to another server such as with SSH-1 (Lanza and Van Ittersum, 2001) or 
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Microsoft Terminal Server (Forsberg, 2003).  Viruses are computer code that is often 
downloaded from web sites, attached to email messages, or opened during instant 
message chats.  Nyxem-E is a recent example of a virus that spreads as an e-mail 
attachment and is designed to delete certain types of files on the third day of each month 
(Countdown, 2006).  The CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey lists viruses as 
the top cause of business losses (Gordon et al., p15).  Exploitation of programming errors 
can be used to gain access to an application or cause an application to stop running.  They 
can also contribute other types of attacks such as both of the previously mentioned MITM 
attacks.  They are the hardest to predict and it is impossible to prevent all possible 
exploits in all the millions of lines of programming code used on a system.  The National 
Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov/) currently reports a publication rate of 16 
vulnerabilities per day 
 There are many solutions available when controlling access to digital resources.  
Most company policies implement several layers of security.  The first layer is 
controlling access to the network and the second is securing the transfer of data between 
networks.  The rest of the layers occur inside the network where the security manager 
must consider the three A's of authentication, authorization, and auditing for each system 
and each user.  Authentication involves verifying that users are who they say they are and 
authorization is the process of granting access.  Auditing, or monitoring, assists the 
administrator in recognizing when an attack has occurred.  This section will review the 
most common implementations of these security layers including some of the types of 
attacks that each can prevent. 
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1.1 Who gets on the network? 
 
 There are two primary ways to gain access to a corporation's networked 
systems.  One is to be physically inside the company and on the same network and the 
other is to be routed to a machine on the network through a gateway or firewall.  
Firewalls are virtual boundaries between networks but do not protect against all threats of 
malicious insiders.  Firewall solutions consist of rules allowing or denying connection 
between two networks.  Some access rules are based on the type of resource being 
accessed, such as allowing any traffic destined for a web server or denying all ftp traffic 
in or out of the network.  Other rules are based on the location of the user or the data such 
as allowing connections coming from another building belonging to the same company.  
A few solutions require a user to authenticate through some software.  An example of the 
last case would be the use of Virtual Public Network (VPN) software which allows users 
at home to be virtually attached to the corporation's network as if they were sitting at a 
desk inside the building.  A single implementation may not be adequate to meet all the 
company needs and a combination of firewall approaches is very common. 
 Firewall solutions are designed to block access coming into a company 
network unless explicitly allowed but the most common implementations do not block 
any outgoing traffic.  Instead, firewalls generally allow any users and applications to send 
data out of the network and also allow replies to such traffic back into the network.  
These users and applications are not required to authenticate before forwarding the data 
outside the network but are instead trusted only because of their location.  Requiring 
authentication to pass from the inside to the outside of a company network requires 
additional software but is a possible solution.  Adding such software may prevent a 
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malicious user who did gain access to the network from sending confidential materials 
out of the network.  It may also prevent otherwise trusted users from accidentally sending 
information outside the network.  The process of authenticating would act as a warning 
prompt to the user that they were about to send information out of the network and is not 
a transparent solution. 
 Protecting resources from users who are inside the building and physically 
connected to the company network is much harder.  Physical locks and security guards 
can keep visitors away from the systems, and workstations and laptops can have 
password protected screensavers and require passwords before booting in case someone 
does walk up to the machine.  Critical servers can be kept in locked server rooms and 
only accessed through the network.  When a company does have clients, contractors, or 
students who need to connect personal laptops to the network, they may use software to 
restrict what systems can connect to the network using the unique address assigned to 
each network adapter.  For example, a student connecting a laptop to a department 
network may need to register the adapter address with the network administrator so that 
the system is allowed to connect.  Authentication and authorization both assist in 
preventing access to individual machines. 
 Firewalls are implemented to accept and deny traffic between networks.  
By accepting any traffic, they have the potential to be used for good or bad.  The 
company employees can communicate with clients and transfer documents to remote 
offices.  However, if all traffic heading out of the network is allowed, then confidential 
material may also be sent to unauthorized recipients.  A firewall may keep a malicious 
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user out of the network, but it may not prevent a user already inside the network from 
sending information out of the network, either maliciously or unintentionally.  
 
1.2 Secure transfer of data between networks. 
 
 There is a common assumption that computer systems are considered 
secure but the network connecting those systems is insecure.  A system administrator 
may feel confident that the systems in their control are only accessed by authorized users.  
The system administrator may also feel confident that unauthorized users cannot connect 
systems to their internal network.  If that data needs to pass through networks and out of 
the company's control there is a chance that someone else may see that data.  
Cryptography can be used to protect data at rest on a system or data in motion crossing 
the network.  Cryptography can also be used to verify the identity of the remote system 
before transferring data. 
 A familiar example of this implementation is when using a web browser 
for online shopping or banking and a lock icon appears in the corner of the browser to 
indicate a secure connection.  To secure the transfer of data the browser uses other 
programs like OpenSSL (http://www.openssl.org) to encrypt the data before putting it on 
the network.  OpenSSL and other programs like it, use Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
standards developed by Netscape (http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/) to handle the 
encryption so that the entire process is transparent to the user.  
 Additionally, before the browser changes the lock icon, cryptography is 
used to identify the remote system.  When the browser application contacts the remote 
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server, the server responds with a digital “certificate of authority” similar to a person 
identifying themselves by presenting a photo ID.  If the application, in this case a 
browser, recognizes the certificate or the digital signature on a certificate, it continues to 
make the connection.  If the signature is not recognized, then the application prompts the 
user to accept the certificate and continue, or reject the certificate and cancel the 
connection.  
 In the web browser example, a connection is made directly between two 
systems that agree on an encryption key for the session.  The data is encrypted on the 
sending system and decrypted on the receiving system.  In applications such as email, a 
direct connection may not occur.  In such cases, a user may choose to encrypt data 
locally.  A user may also choose to encrypt data that will be stored on a local system or 
transferred with removable media.  The most commonly used software for users includes 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (http://www.pgpi.org/) and GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) 
(http://www.gnupg.org/).  Most current mail programs are able to call these applications 
to encrypt or decrypt the mail messages for the user. 
 The final way that data can be protected as it moves between systems is 
for the network connection to be encrypted.  Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) 
(http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/OLD/ipsec-charter.html) is a standard for security of 
the network connection between two systems or networks.  Any application can then send 
data through the secure connection and not need to encrypt the data first.  This standard is 
most commonly used with Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions that allow users at 
home to securely attach to a company network.  
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 Encryption of the data does not prevent the packets from being seen on the 
network but it does make it harder to read those packets.  In order to decrypt messages, 
an electronic key is required.  The idea is that the encryption code used cannot be broken 
and only the person with the correct key can read the contents.  However, if the wrong 
person obtains the keys, they may be able to read private information such as bank 
account numbers, user IDs, and passwords. 
  
1.3 Who gets on the machine/services?  (Authentication) 
 
 Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of the user before access is 
granted to a network, computer, or application.  This is most commonly handled with a 
combination of a user ID and a password.  There are other methods available, such as 
token and biometric methods.  Some companies even require multiple authentication 
methods, such as a user ID and password followed by a fingerprint scan before access is 
granted to a particular computer. 
 Token authentication, such as RSA SecurID 
(http://www.rsasecurity.com/node.asp?id=1156), generally involves a small electronic 
device with an embedded encryption key and an LCD display.  When signing on to a 
system, the user must provide not only a user ID and password, but also the correct key 
which the user reads off the LCD display of SecurID device.  The key changes rapidly – 
usually every minute. 
 Biometric authentication includes fingerprint scanning, retina scanning, and voice 
or face recognition systems.  These are often seen as immature solutions because of their 
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limited testing and unknown vulnerabilities. For example, the most common fingerprint 
scanners have been bypassed with Play-Doh molds of fingerprints.  (ByteEnable, 2005).  
These authentication methods will also see little use as long as they continue to have high 
costs for hardware and limited software availability.  
 The most common method of authentication is a simple user ID and 
password combination.  In a large company, this can require managing users on many 
computers and centralized authentication is a common solution.  Centralized 
authentication allows a user to have the same user ID and password on multiple machines 
and any changes to the user account, including passwords, are kept in a single location.  
Common solutions are referenced in Table 1.   
Table 1: Centralized Authentication Methods 
Network Information Services (NIS) 
http://docs.sun.com/app/docs/doc/817-4843/6mkbebd7a?a=view#a00intro-97078
Lightweight Directory Access Protocols (LDAP)  
RFC 2251 http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2251.html
Active Directory Services (ADS) 
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/technologies/directory/activedirector
y/default.mspx
Kerberos 
http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/
 
 NIS is a UNIX and Linux implementation, ADS is a Microsoft 
implementation, and LDAP and Kerberos are available on multiple platforms.  Kerberos 
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not only allows central administration of user authentication but also allows users to have 
a “single sign on” so that they do not need to authenticate to each machine in the 
network.  Centralized authentication methods are easier to administer than distributed 
methods but require that authentication information transfer across the network.  
Encryption can protect the authentication data in transit but a compromised 
authentication server can result in access to all systems. 
 
 
1.4 Once on the machine – what access?  (Authorization) 
 
 Generally, access is granted when a user authenticates.  A user's  identity is 
confirmed and permissions are assigned.  The access granted may be read, or read and 
write permission to a database or the ability to add users to a system or print a document.  
There are two major types of access control methods.  
 Discretionary access control (DAC) methods allow the owner of the file, 
project, or other object to manage that particular resource.  This is the most common type 
of access control for files in an operating system.  Users “own” the files they create and 
they are allowed to determine which other users have read or write access to those files.  
The owner of the file is also allowed to delete the file.  This allows users to do their jobs 
without contacting an administrator every time they need to make changes to the access 
control settings.  There may be a written company policy defining what a user should or 
should not allow but an administrator cannot force particular permissions.  If a user 
changes all their files to allow read and write permission to everyone on the system, the 
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best the administrator can do is change the permissions to a more restrictive setting, 
educate the user, and hope it does not happen again. 
 There are several kinds of non-discretionary access control methods but they 
all implement some method of a policy maintained and configured by an administrator. 
Non-discretionary access control is common within applications, especially database 
applications, where an administrator decides who can read, change, add, or delete a 
record and the person that creates the record may not be allowed to delete the record.  
 The most common types of non-discretionary access control methods are Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC), Type Enforcement (TE), and Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC).  In RBAC, permissions are associated with roles such as user, team leader, 
manager, or administrator.  User accounts are then associated with a role and thus granted 
privileges to related files, programs, or actions within programs.  RBAC is commonly 
used in database applications and recently also in several operating systems including 
MicroSoft, SUN, and Hewlett Packard products.  TE involves specific labels of objects 
and a static access matrix (Smalley, 2000).  Each file and user is assigned a type and the 
policy defines what access is allowed between pairs of types.  TE is often a building 
block of non-discretionary access control methods but when used alone such as in the 
SecureOS product (Secure Computing Company, n.d.) it also refers to a mandatory 
policy that does not include any unconstrained privileges.  MAC is sometimes used as a 
general term for all non-discretionary methods but is also the term used in SELinux 
(http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/) and other operating systems that use a combination of 
different methods.  SELinux, for example, uses primarily TE with some RBAC.  MAC 
can also refer to a multi-level labeling of objects and users with classifications such as 
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confidential, internal, and public.  A user is granted access to files based on the security 
levels. 
 Whereas firewalls allow or deny a connection to a network and 
authentication allows or denies a user to a computer, access controls allow or deny the 
use of individual files, processes, or actions on a system.  Allowing individual users to 
manage that access is usually sufficient on personal machines.  However, there is a risk if 
access control is left to the user that he or she may unknowingly grant access to a 
confidential document or a developer may unknowingly write an application that will 
share internal information to an external connection. 
 
1.5 Ongoing monitoring and response (Auditing) 
 
 No existing security solutions can prevent all problems.  Monitoring systems, 
networks, and connections and having a response strategy is also critical.  Regular 
monitoring allows administrators to recognize normal patterns such as the amount of 
activity through a firewall at different times of the day.  If a sudden increase in activity 
occurs, the administrator can investigate the cause and determine if an attack has 
occurred.  Additionally, many attacks, or attempts at attacks, leave messages in log files.  
An administrator who notices many failed logon attempts may investigate to determine if 
users are forgetting passwords or an intruder is trying to guess passwords. 
 Some auditing can be scheduled and managed with software such as virus 
scanning software that is scheduled to run each morning on workstations.  Virus detection 
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and spam filtering software can also be installed on mail servers to prevent files from 
reaching the workstations in the first place.   
 Firewall systems may also run Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) which will send 
a message to the pager of an administrator or block a connection based on detecting a 
specified type or amount of traffic.  For example, once the software is configured and 
assigned a threshold for normal activity, if an exceptional amount of traffic coming from 
a single external system is detected, that system may be blocked from sending anything.  
This can prevent denial of service attacks.  An IDS is often implemented to work together 
with a firewall.  The firewall blocks all traffic except what is specifically allowed and an 
IDS allows all traffic unless triggered to do otherwise. 
 Some auditing must be done manually.  Software such as Logwatch 
(http://www2.logwatch.org:8080/) or Swatch (http://swatch.sourceforge.net/) can review 
a log file and sort out known normal messages, known problem messages, and unknown 
messages.  It is still up to a human to review the messages, investigate the cause or causes 
of the messages, and respond.  Responding may be as simple as reconfiguring the 
monitoring software to better identify the messages that can be ignored or it may involve 
following a company policy for recovering a compromised machine.  In addition to 
monitoring log files, recognizing normal usage of memory, processors, or disk space, and 
investigating unusual patterns can identify a compromised machine. 
 
 There are many layers of security available in the digital world.  Each layer has 
benefits and vulnerabilities.  Choosing the correct combination is an act of balancing 
protection from attack, ease of use for employees, and total costs of implementation.  A 
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combination of many layers allows a company to protect as many resources as possible 
but having multiple layers providing similar protection also ensures that if one layer is 
compromised, the data may still be protected.  In the next section, we will expand on the 
benefits of adding mandatory access controls in the operating system. 
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2. Mandatory Access control at the operating system level. 
 
  Many system administrators are familiar with the layers of security 
mentioned in the last section, but what happens when the cracker gets past the firewall 
and onto a system?  What happens when the control of that system allows the cracker to 
change the access to the database?  How long does it take to find a compromised system 
when the cracker has altered the log entries to hide their presence?  By adding additional 
access control at the operating system, administrators can limit the damage that can be 
done by an intruder who has gained access to that system.  This section will look at 
examples of vulnerabilities that can be contained with operating system access control 
methods and introduce a few mandatory access control products that are available. 
 Consider a vulnerability taken from the US-CERT Current Activity entry 
added Jan 16, 2006:  
 US-CERT is aware of a public exploit for a vulnerability in VERITAS NetBackup 
Volume Manager Daemon (vmd).  The VERITAS NetBackup vmd listens on 
network port 13701/tcp.  An attacker could send a specially crafted packet to the 
Volume Manager on a vulnerable system to cause a buffer overflow or a denial-
of-service condition. Successful exploitation may allow a remote, unauthenticated 
attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system with root or SYSTEM 
privileges.  (Gennari, 2006)   
 
 An implementation of operating system level mandatory access control could 
contain the attack.  If the exploit is utilized and a cracker gains access to the system with 
system privilege, they still could not leave the “jail” around the backup program.  Attacks 
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similar to this cannot be predicted and there is often a time delay between a vulnerability 
being detected and a fully tested patch being available.  Vulnerabilities for which no 
patch is yet available are known as O-days (“oh days”) (McCarty, 2006, p6).  A few 
years ago, it was estimated that 95 percent of attempted network intrusions target 
vulnerabilities for which patches are available (McCarty, p7).  In recent years, the time 
between reported vulnerabilities has dropped from weeks and months to days and hours 
(Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005, p2).  Even if a vulnerability is reported and a patch is 
available, there is a time lag before a system administrator can test and apply the patch.  
Using mandatory access controls may protect these unpatched systems by catching and 
containing attacks. 
 The most common exploits of programming errors can be classified into four 
categories (Dalton and Choo, 200).  The first is the “misuse of privilege to gain direct 
access to protected system resources” (Dalton and Choo, p59).  This can be prevented 
somewhat by running applications as a non-privileged user.  The application user should 
not have access to any system resource not required by the application.  Many operating 
systems and network server applications already implement this strategy.  The Apache 
Web Server runs as the ordinary user "apache".  If a vulnerability allows the execution of 
arbitrary code, that code runs with the privileges of the user “apache” rather than a 
system user (Cohen, 2003).  Even properly managed discretionary access controls can 
prevent damage from this type of vulnerability. 
 The second category is “subversion of application-enforced access 
controls” (Dalton and Choo, 2001, p59) where an attacker gains access through an 
application to a legitimate resource but in an unauthorized manner.  A web server may be 
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allowed to run a script and create dynamic content for the user.  That script may in turn 
read a system password file and display the contents for the external user.  If it is up to 
the web server to decide who has access to view the password file, a malicious user may 
find a way around that decision.  This type of attack is hard to control outside of the 
application design.   
 The third category is the “supply of bogus security decision-making 
information” (Dalton and Choo, 2001, p59) where the attacker gains access to one 
application and then uses security information found there to supply forged information 
to another application.  Generally, the compromised application in this case is an 
authentication service.  Containment of applications at an operating system level can help 
prevent this type of attack by ensuring that only the application service can access the 
supporting authentication service. 
 The final category is the “illegitimate use of unprotected system 
resources” (Dalton and Choo, 2001, p59) where access to an application results in access 
to any number of other resources on the system that do not require any separate 
authentication.  Consider the malicious user who has gained access to the system as the 
user “apache”.  Another program on the system which is not available to external users 
through legitimate uses of the web server, is available to local users such as apache.  The 
malicious user is now allowed to access this program and may take advantage of another 
vulnerability to escalate the local privilege to system privilege (Rafail, 2004).  With a 
mandatory access control policy in the operating system, even if the malicious user is 
able to change from a local user to a system user in name, the MAC identity does not 
change and the privilege does not change.  (Loscocco and Smalley, 2001, pt 1) 
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 If each program can be confined to its own space within the operating system, 
then any damage through a compromised program should also be confined to that space.  
An operating system mandatory access control policy can prevent an application from 
changing identity or roles.  Even if the malicious user gains access as a system user, he or 
she will still not have access to other components of the system outside of the web server 
space.  
 Most firewall implementations do not protect against malicious or 
unaware insiders.  A strong authentication service on a firewall may prevent a malicious 
user from sending confidential data out of a network.  Additionally a mandatory access 
control mechanism in the operating system on the internal computers can prevent 
malicious software from connecting to external resources.  Only trusted software can 
communicate with the authentication software of the firewall (Loscocco, Smalley, 
Muckelbauer, Taylor, Turner, & Farrell, 1998 pt 4.4).  Similarly, the encryption and 
authentication layers of security can also be further protected by mandatory access 
controls in the operating system.  The ability to connect to the authentication service and 
encryption keys can be restricted to trusted applications and malicious code should not be 
able to use tampering, bypassing, or spoofing attacks (Loscocco et al., 1998, pt 1).  
 There are many operating systems that have employed one or more 
methods of non-discretionary access controls.  A sample is provided in the Appendix.  
Choosing a solution requires reviewing the existing environment to see how well each 
possible solution will integrate with other security protections, applications, and policies.  
The next section will look at a few considerations for migrating to an operating system 
which supports MAC. 
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3. Implementation Concerns 
 
 With so many reasons to implement operating system mandatory access 
controls, it would be reasonable to assume that every operating system would include a 
mandatory access control solution and all companies would make use of this security 
technology.  The technology has been used with classified government systems for over 
20 years, however, it is only in the past few years that this has become available in 
common operating systems such as SUN Solaris, HP Unix, Microsoft Server, or Linux.  
A large reason for the limited availability is that MAC policies are more complicated to 
manage than their standard counterparts. An administrator must configure and maintain 
the policy instead of each user doing so, and each application running on the system must 
conform to the policy.  The fewer the number of applications, the easier to manage, but 
with the variety of software used in most businesses, there are too many variables to 
create a default or standard policy (Dalton and Choo, 2001, p60).  This section will 
address some of the considerations for choosing any access control policy and 
specifically for implementing an operating system mandatory access control mechanism. 
 
3.1 Legal Regulations 
 One reason to review any access control policy is to meet various legal 
requirements.  Table 2 lists a sample of regulations that may apply to an organization.  
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The laws can also provide guidance for developing a good security policy even if 
compliance is not required for a specific business.  There are a number of case studies 
and other resources that assist in addressing specific legal requirements but most of the 
laws do not specify how the access control should be implemented, only that there must 
be adequate controls.  Therefore, the laws also often require an audit and evaluation 
procedure.  This may be as simple as a semi-annual review of the policies or as complex 
as being able to show in a formal investigation who accessed which resources and when. 
 
Table 2: Some Government Regulations for Information Security 
Government Regulation Purpose 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiative
s/glbact.html  
Financial institutions must ensure 
security and confidentiality of customer 
records and information, protect against 
anticipated threats, and protect against 
unauthorized access. 
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Government Regulation Purpose 
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPPA) 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/  
 
Also see: 
“Role-Based Access Control in Healthcare” 
RSA Security. 
<http://www.rsasecurity.com/solutions/ 
health/downloads/RBAC_WP_1002.pdf> 
Requires heath care professionals to 
protect information against anticipated 
threats and ensure confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of created, 
received, maintained, or transmitted 
entity. Requires not only that the 
information transmitted between 
networks be encrypted but also what 
information is received and sent must be 
controlled.  HIPPA also requires 
physical security of systems and audit 
policies. 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:H.R.3763.ENR:%20
Senior executives of publicly traded 
companies must establish and maintain 
adequate internal control s of financial 
information and implement a plan for 
reporting and auditing. 
Federal Information Security and 
Management Act (FISMA) 
http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/  
Specifies requirements for the federal 
government and does not directly create 
liability for private sector but is often 
used as an example of good practices. 
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Government Regulation Purpose 
Family Educational Right to Privacy Act 
(FERPA) 
http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/ferp
a/index.html  
Technology, Education and Copyright 
Harmonization Act (TEACH) 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c107:S.487.ES:  
Requires protection of student records 
and prevention of unauthorized sharing 
of copyright materials. 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) 
 http://cio.doe.gov/Documents/ECPA.HTM 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) 
http://cio.doe.gov/Documents/CFA.HTM  
Creates criminal penalties for persons 
who gain unauthorized access to 
electronic records. 
 
 MAC in an operating system can assist in enforcing the confidentiality required 
by many of these laws and they can assist in preventing unauthorized access to 
applications and the data they contain.  MAC will also log an access failure thus 
providing part of the audit functions required by many of these laws.  If the organization 
is required to comply with any of these laws, it is recommended that a lawyer be included 
on team from the beginning (Rogers, 2005, chap. 5) to ensure that all requirements are 
met.  Additionally, the security policy should regularly be reviewed for compliance since 
laws and technologies can both change. 
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3.2 Security Certification 
 In addition to legal regulations, a company may wish to use products with a 
specific security certification.  Certification performed by a central and neutral 
organization provides assurance that a product or environment meets a list of 
requirements.  Sometimes certification is required, or at least requested, by a client.  For 
example, most government agencies must use certified products and work with vendors 
that also use certified products and policies.  There are a few general standards and 
certification processes that can be considered when choosing an access control method. 
 TPEP Evaluated Products by Rating (National Security Agency, 2000) lists 
products by a A1 (high) to C2 (minimal) security rating used by the US government for 
classification of NSA Trusted Products.  The lowest rating, C2, requires DAC with log-in 
procedures and auditing events.  The B1 and higher ratings require MAC and 
increasingly strict review and auditing processes.  Many companies still advertise 
products as compliant with these ratings but formal certification no longer exists.   
 The NSA has replaced the Trusted Products evaluation program with the 
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) (http://niap.nist.gov/cc-
scheme/defining-ccevs.html) which uses a numbered Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 
that is recognized internationally.  Each increasing level has more requirements and more 
testing resulting in a more secure rating, but also a higher cost for the certification 
process.  EAL1 is functionally tested, requires only minimal documentation, a single 
independent test, informal development specifications, and no vulnerability testing.  
EAL4 is methodically designed, requires more documentation of the design and more 
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independent testing.  It is also the highest level mutually recognized by all countries 
using the Common Criteria.  The highest level, EAL7, requires formal developer 
specifications, a formal security policy model, and rigorous testing including 
vulnerability assessment (Common Criteria, 2005).  Microsoft Windows Server 2003 and 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux both carry an EAL4 certification. 
  Another standard for information security is offered by the International 
Organization for Standardization (www.iso.org).  ISO 17799 describes several criteria for 
creating and auditing a company security policy.  The security policy should contain 
information including which departments or positions are responsible for security, how to 
secure physical areas and access to computers and networks, and, if an attack did occur, 
how to respond and recover.  The security policy should also describe how the company 
complies with any necessary legal requirements, what kind of a review procedure exists, 
and how to interact with the news media, particularly in the event of an attack (ISO 
17799 Central, 2004).  With ISO 17799, the company is certified rather than a specific 
product.  The certification is an assurance for clients that the company has an acceptable 
security plan. 
 
3.3 Cost of implementation 
 Implementing a new security procedure comes at a price.  A few companies 
may be able to turn on a feature within an existing operating system and see what 
happens.  More likely, though, the company policy will require a development system 
and a test cycle before deployment.  Some situations will also require new products, new 
staff, and training for current and new administrators.  There are several questions to ask 
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when considering migration to a MAC operating system but many of the costs are the 
same as implementing any new system. 
 Does the company already have an operating system capable of mandatory 
access control?  If the computers already use an operating system with MAC support, 
enabling the capability may be sufficient.  Otherwise, a new operating system will need 
to be purchased and administration staff will need to be trained on the new environment.  
Purchasing a fully supported operating system such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux will cost 
at least three hundred dollars and a premium version with enterprise level support is 
likely to be over two thousand dollars.  If new hardware is also needed to support the new 
operating system, it is possible to reach six figure amounts. 
 Do all the applications support the use of operating system MAC 
implementations?  Some environments will not support MAC.  For example, Global File 
System (GFS) used by Red Hat for high availability clustering and shared storage 
situations does not yet support SELinux mandatory access controls.  Since SELinux 
stores the MAC information in attributes of the file system, GFS must be revised before it 
can be used with SELinux.  Other applications may just require modifications to the 
MAC policy.  For example, Red Hat Satellite Service is a system management and 
deployment application.  As written, the default MAC policy in Red Hat Linux is too 
restrictive to allow Satellite Server to function correctly.  If a company uses many 
proprietary applications it may take a long time to evaluate which applications will work, 
which applications will not work, and which applications might work with a few MAC 
policy changes.  Additional training on creating custom policies may be required, 
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especially to allow custom applications to benefit from MAC.  A one week training class 
will cost about $2500 plus travel and time away from the office. 
 Will the data and applications need to be moved to a new system or a 
different type of system?  There are several reasons for a system migration but unless the 
company already has the hardware, it may also be a costly task.  A different operating 
system may be needed or the company deployment procedures may require a test period 
on a separate system before full deployment.  In addition, even if the operating system 
does not change, it may be simpler to enable MAC using a new installation.  For 
example, it is tedious to convert a Linux system from SELinux “disabled” to “enabled” 
since it requires setting an attribute on each and every file on the system. It is easier to 
install (or reinstall) a system and the copy data from backup.  As it is created, each new 
file on an SELinux enabled system will automatically get a security attribute.  A test or 
development system might come from the company's existing inventory or cost only a 
few hundred dollars but a complete duplication of a high end enterprise server will likely 
cost thousands of dollars. 
 Does the existing system administration staff have the skills for the 
operating system and the access control implementation?  Training for current system 
administrators can be costly both in course fees and in time away from the office.  Test 
environments and self study guides may be as little as a few hundred dollars but usually 
take a lot longer to complete. Hiring a consultant for the initial evaluation and migration 
may be worth the cost, often starting at $200 per hour, if there is a critical time deadline 
for implementation. 
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3.4 Cost of not implementing MAC 
 
 If there are still concerns about the cost of implementing non-discretionary 
access control, consider the cost of NOT securing the OS.  
 According to the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (Gordon, et 
al., 2005, p15), the top dollar amount losses by type are 1. Virus, 2. Unauthorized Access 
and 3. Theft of proprietary information.  Other top ten losses come from laptop theft, 
misuse of web applications, and system penetration.  The estimated losses per respondent 
in the categories of unauthorized access ($303,234) and theft of proprietary information 
($355,552) both more than tripled between 2004 and 2005.  In addition, the incidents 
occurring from inside the network have been greater than the number of incidents 
originating outside the network in each of the past seven years (Gordon et al., p12).  
While the same survey lists firewalls and anti-virus software as the most used 
technologies, these technologies usually do not prevent internal incidents. 
 There are resources available to assist with risk assessment.  The National 
Institute of Standards (NIST) has a “Security Self Assessment Guide for IT Specialist” 
(Swanson, 2001) which contains a checklist for management, operational, and technical 
controls.  The National Security Agency also has a methodology for evaluation of 
information security implementation and risks (Rogers, 2005).  
 The more layers of security that are implemented, the less the likelihood 
of a catastrophic incident resulting in lost data, lost revenue, lawsuits, fines, or loss of the 
customers' trust.  Access control policies, including mandatory access control policies 
should be considered along with all other layer of security.   
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 With all of the legal certification, costs, and risks in mind, a company can 
begin the process of reviewing what resources are already in place.  The legal department 
can review compliance with the laws and the systems administration staff can request the 
training, hardware, and software needed to implement new security methods.  
Management may also request an external evaluation of the existing risk or have 
members of the existing staff use one of the self evaluation guides mentioned above 
before making a decision as to which, if any, new security measures should be tested or 
implemented. 
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Conclusion 
 Security is a process, not a product or group of products.  New threats are 
always appearing and new products to detect, protect, prevent, and respond to each threat 
are appearing just as quickly.  Layers of security from firewalls to auditing can help 
prevent intrusions and data loss.  Access controls are a key component to security in both 
applications and the operating system.  Today, mandatory access controls, especially in 
the operating system, can help prevent a vulnerability in one application from 
compromising other applications and systems but are not universally used.  This may 
change in the future as different threats become more serious. 
 Cyveillence, a provider of risk monitoring and management solutions, 
predicts “Fraud, unlicensed product sales, physical-cyber threats and information leaks 
are among the most serious information threats facing organizations today” (Cyveillence, 
2006).  One of the biggest concerns is trusted employees distributing information either 
maliciously or accidentally (“Who's Got”, 2006, p3).  MAC can prevent some of this 
information leakage but it cannot prevent an employee from posting sensitive information 
to a blog or chat room from outside the organization.   
 Cyveillence also believes that the increase in sophistication of attacks 
makes enterprise security even more challenging (“Who's Got”, 2006, p5) and a similar 
report from IBM adds that attackers are more organized and committed, thereby resulting 
in more targeted and damaging attacks (“IBM Report”, 2006).  Besides insider threats 
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and blogs, top concerns in the IBM report include mobile devices and attacks from 
emerging markets such as Eastern Europe and Asia where laws and enforcement are 
limited.  Future concerns include voice spam through Voice over IP (VoIP) technology 
and new legislation requiring additional access control and audit capabilities.  California 
already requires that a company notify a client when personal information may have been 
stolen.  This type of legislation and others such as one that formally defines spyware and 
its uses are under discussion in the federal government (“Top Security Trends”, 2005). 
 MAC in the operating system is a useful tool when protecting against 
vulnerabilities caused by programming errors but software development is also changing.  
On-demand computing is driving modular programs and virtualization software 
(Greenemeier, 2006).  Users want to reduce the complexity of programs and be able to 
run multiple environments on the same system.  It is unclear how MAC policies will 
work across modules and virtual machines.  It is likely that each virtual machine will 
have its own policy adding to the complexity of implementing MAC.  Finally, as MAC 
becomes more popular or necessary, tools for simplifying the policy creation will be 
necessary such as automation wizards for SELinux policy management provided in 
SLIDE (http://www.tresys.com/news/press26.shtml)   
 A digital security policy must address all the current threats and also be 
ready for any future threats.  A security policy is a living document that must be reviewed 
and revised on a regular basis to ensure that as many threats as possible are being 
prevented while at the same time keeping legitimate access as transparent as possible.  It 
is not enough to choose a security policy and implement the technical aspects.  That 
policy must also include a review process that includes monitoring threats, 
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countermeasures, and related changes so that the policy can be tuned to meet current 
needs.  Mandatory access controls are only one small piece of the overall policy and 
procedures. 
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Appendix 
Table 3: Some Products that Provide MAC for Operating Systems 
Company Product Description 
Microsoft Windows 
Server 2003 
Implements RBAC and offers an Authorization 
Manager product to assist with the management. 
http://technet2.microsoft.com/WindowsServer/en/Library/72b55950-86cc-4c7f-
8fbf-3063276cd0b61033.mspx
Sun Trusted Solaris 
Operating 
System 
Implements MAC to associate programs with a 
security level. 
http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/trustedsolaris/index.xml
Hewlett 
Packard 
HP-UX 11i V2 Implements RBAC 
http://www.hp.com/products1/unix/operating/RBAC.html?jumpid=reg_R1002_USE
N
Hewlett 
Packard 
HP-LX A version of Linux with modifications to the 
kernel providing containment, auditing, and MAC.
http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/als01/edwards.html
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National 
Security 
Agency 
SELinux A krenel patch for Linux included in a number of 
distributions such as Red Hat (www.redhat.com) 
which provides MAC through a combination of 
RBAC and TE. 
http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/
RSBAC 
Project 
RSBAC A kernel patch for Linux using RBAC along with 
antivirus software and resource limitations. 
http://www.rsbac.org/ 
LIDS Project Linux Intrusion 
Detection 
System 
A kernel patch for Linux and a set of 
administration tools for restricting access and 
detecting port scans. 
http://www.lids.org/ 
GRSecurity 
Project 
Grsecurity A kernel patch for Linux that adds RBAC, security 
alerts, and extensive auditing. 
http://www.grsecurity.net/ 
BSD TrustedBSD A Kernel module for BSD which provides MAC 
through a mature TE implementation. 
http://www.trustedbsd.org/home.html 
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